Drilling their own graves: how the European oil and gas supermajors avoid sustainability tensions through mythmaking by Ferns, George et al.
ORIGINAL PAPER
Drilling their Own Graves: How the European Oil and Gas
Supermajors Avoid Sustainability Tensions Through Mythmaking
George Ferns1 • Kenneth Amaeshi2 • Aliette Lambert3
Received: 13 July 2017 / Accepted: 1 November 2017
 The Author(s) 2017. This article is an open access publication
Abstract This study explores how paradoxical tensions
between economic growth and environmental protection
are avoided through organizational mythmaking. By
examining the European oil and gas supermajors’ ‘‘CEO-
speak’’ about climate change, we show how mythmaking
facilitates the disregarding, diverting, and/or displacing of
sustainability tensions. In doing so, our findings further
illustrate how certain defensive responses are employed:
(1) regression, or retreating to the comforts of past famil-
iarities, (2) fantasy, or escaping the harsh reality that fossil
fuels and climate change are indeed irreconcilable, and (3)
projecting, or shifting blame to external actors for failing to
address climate change. By highlighting the discursive
effects of enacting these responses, we illustrate how the
European oil and gas supermajors self-determine their
inability to substantively address the complexities of cli-
mate change. We thus argue that defensive responses are
not merely a form of mismanagement as the paradox and
corporate sustainability literature commonly suggests, but a
strategic resource that poses serious ethical concerns given
the imminent danger of issues such as climate change.
Keywords Paradox  Climate change  Organizational
mythmaking  Discourse  Defensive responses  Corporate
sustainability
I know some fear that the environmental issues
threaten the whole future of the industry, […] such
fear can be paralysing and ultimately will be self-
defeating because nothing will threaten the future of
the industry more than ignoring reality
John Browne (1998c), former CEO of BP, speech at
the World Energy Congress, Houston (TX)
Corporate sustainability confronts organizations with
interdependent economic, social, and environmental con-
cerns (Elkington 1998). While these three dimensions must
be considered together in order to contribute to sustainable
development (Gladwin et al. 1995), firms tend to discrim-
inate against social and environmental concerns in favor of
financial returns (McWilliams and Siegel 2000). Seeking to
overcome this dilemma, scholars increasingly draw from
paradox theory that considers organizations inherently
conflictual sites and emphasizes that tensions, if properly
harnessed, ‘‘can be powerful to enable peak performance’’
(Smith and Lewis 2011, p. 395). Applied to corporate
sustainability, scholars argue that instead of ignoring
tensions between economic, social, and environmental
dimensions, firms should accept and embrace often
contradictory demands simultaneously (Berger et al.
2007; Gao and Bansal 2013; Hahn et al. 2014, 2017). By
foregoing temptation to ignore sustainability tensions,
managers can confront complexity directly, thereby poten-
tially transcending the otherwise stifling trichotomy of
economic, social, and environmental dimensions (Hahn
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et al. 2015). This is commonly referred to as a ‘‘paradox
approach’’ or ‘‘integrative view’’ on corporate sustainabil-
ity (for overview see Van der Byl and Slawinski 2015).
This literature demonstrates the efficacy of a paradox
perspective in confronting sustainability tensions, often
highlighting its productive outcomes. However, it largely
overlooks defensive responses through which firms aim to
avoid sustainability tensions (Iivonen 2017), and the ethical
implications therein. This oversight persists despite earlier
studies explicitly cautioning against defensive reactions
given potentially detrimental consequences for organiza-
tional survival (Leonard-Barton 1992; Sundaramurthy and
Lewis 2003; Vince and Broussine 1996). Accordingly, as
Schad et al. (2016, p. 39) note in their review of the past
25 years of paradox literature, there have been several calls
to investigate ‘‘[how] defense mechanisms can cause good
intentions to result in undesired outcomes.’’ We heed these
calls by exploring the ‘‘defense mechanisms’’ or defensive
responses that firms employ to avoid sustainability tensions,
particularly focusing on responses toward climate change. In
doing so, we analyzed ‘‘CEO-speak’’ (Amernic and Craig
2006) of the European supermajors—BP, Shell and Total.1
These companies—and the words of their CEOs—are crit-
ical in the global debate on climate change, shaping much of
the business-climate change discourse (Levy 2005). CEO-
speak refers to instances in which CEOs communicate
publically on behalf of their organization, for instance
through corporate reports, in the media, during speeches at
industry conferences, universities, and so forth. Situating our
study within a critical-interpretivist discourse analysis tra-
dition (Fairclough and Wodak 1997; Mumby 1987), we are
interested in how the European supermajors’ CEO-speak
obfuscates tensions between climate change and their core
business of producing and selling fossil fuels (see also Put-
nam et al. 2016, p. 109). To conceptualize this process, we
draw from the concept of organizational mythmaking—a
symbolic act that simplifies complexity and legitimates the
views of the mythmaker (Boje et al. 1982; Brown 1994;
Filby and Willmott 1988; Wright and Nyberg 2014).
Our findings illustrate how the construction of three
myths—the techno-fix, Promethean oil man, and climate
partnerships—facilitate defensive responses that act to
either entrench well-established understandings and prac-
tices that are themselves environmentally harmful, or
transfer tension from the source of the problem (i.e., the
production of fossil fuels) to external actors such as the
government or civil society organizations. We demonstrate
how, by avoiding sustainability tensions through organi-
zational mythmaking the European supermajors become
increasingly embedded into a self-referential myopia that
limits their potential to imagine an alternative energy
future that is likely discordant with the myths they them-
selves construct. This has significant ethical implications:
defensive responses not only help the supermajors evade
responsibility to address climate change but also
marginalize alternative discourses, including those groups
who identify with these discourses.
Our study contributes to literature on paradox and cor-
porate sustainability by illustrating how sustainability ten-
sions are actively avoided through symbolic action (i.e.,
mythmaking). Rather than expose the ‘‘bizarre’’ contra-
diction between fossil fuel-based growth and climate
change mitigation (Wright and Nyberg 2015a, p. 28), we
show how this contradiction is repressed. The implications
of this repression are potentially devastating for the natural
environment, not to mention corporate performance, hence
our title: ‘‘Drilling their own graves.’’
Organizational Paradox and Corporate
Sustainability
Responses to tensions, contradictions, and paradoxes
regarding sustainability are generally conceptualized in
three ways: acceptance, confrontation, and avoidance.
Firstly, in terms of acceptance, actors acknowledge para-
doxes as unsolvable puzzles that are part of everyday
existence (Poole and van de Ven 1989; Smith and Lewis
2011). Without opposition toward tensions per se, man-
agers improvise when confronted, thereby avoiding the
difficulties and risks of attempting a controlled resolution.
The paradox is left open; Pandora’s box remains shut
(Beech et al. 2004). With corporate sustainability, accep-
tance strategies may be effective on an individual level
(Ivory and Brooks 2017). However, on an organizational
level, acceptance strategies are arguably less effective
given that organizations could face, inter alia, legitimacy
threats from stakeholders with contending views. These
stakeholders may enforce a ‘‘moral minimum’’ (e.g., Ide-
mudia 2008, p. 94), insisting organizations fulfill certain
affirmative duties such as providing a safe work environ-
ment. Such moral considerations become further pro-
nounced within the public sphere in the case of large,
multinational firms operating in developing countries,
which ‘‘are simultaneously challenged by a multitude of
[…] issues and environmental demands are characterized
1 The term ‘‘supermajors’’ was coined by Doug Terreson, Managing
Director and Head of Energy Research at Morgan Stanley to refer to
the newly formed BP-Amoco prior to the two companies merging in
1998. The term, which first appeared in an issue of Business Week
(1997) became increasing popular after further mergers, notably
between Exxon and Mobil in 1999. There are six supermajors—BP
plc, Chevron Corporation, ExxonMobil Corporation, Royal Dutch
Shell plc, Total SA and Eni SpA. These are considered the six largest
non-state owned oil and gas companies by total revenue (Gensler
2017).
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by high dynamism, complexity, and heterogeneity’’
(Scherer et al. 2013, p. 275).
The second conceptualization involves firms proactively
confronting sustainability tensions (Lewis 2000; Vince and
Broussine 1996). As indicated by Poole and Van de Ven
(1989), this can be achieved either by separating or syn-
thesizing tensions. On the one hand, in terms of the former,
tensions are rendered manageable by compartmentalizing
conflicting poles (Smith and Lewis 2011). At extremes,
entire organizations split to better manage tensions. E.ON,
one of Germany’s ‘‘Big 4’’ energy providers, for example
severed its fossil fuel and renewables businesses, forming
two separate entities (Timperley 2016). On the other hand,
when proactively responding to paradox by synthesis,
tensions are forged into a new form, understood as complex
interdependencies rather than contradictions (Jarzabkowski
et al. 2013). For instance, in their study of the Alberta oil
sands, Slawinski and Bansal (2015) highlight how some
firms, instead of polarizing short- and long-term perspec-
tives, creatively juxtaposed them to better manage tempo-
ral tensions related to climate change. This is indicative of
‘‘paradox thinking’’—a cognitive frame that fosters
accommodation of conflicting yet inter-related sustain-
ability dimensions (Hahn et al. 2015; Kannothra et al.
2017). Paradox thinking is akin to Gao and Bansal’s (2013,
p. 247) ‘‘integrative’’ approach to managing social and
environmental issues, which applies an ethical orientation
‘‘achieved by fulfilling conflicting responsibilities, in one’s
best capacity, with compassion and sympathy.’’
A third conceptualization widely undertheorized in the
sustainability literature concerns a defensive strategy
whereby paradox is avoided (Lewis 2000; Smith and Berg
1987). Here, scholars draw from Freudian psychoanalytic
theory to demonstrate how individuals respond defensively
in tension-laden and anxiety-provoking situations (Dey
et al. 2016). A defensive response or mechanism refers to
‘‘any policy or action that prevents someone (or some
system) from experiencing embarrassment or threat, and
simultaneously prevents anyone from correcting the causes
of the embarrassment or threat’’ (Argyris 1993, p. 40).
Typical examples include, among others, shifting blame
toward a scapegoat or repressing unpleasant emotions and
thoughts (Vince and Broussine 1996). This is counterpro-
ductive given that, in the long term, avoidance intensifies
complexity, creates vicious cycles, and produces negative
feedback loops (Smith and Lewis 2011). Avoiding tensions
also has serious ethical ramifications as is evidenced by
corporate scandals such as WorldCom and Tyco in which
managers developed pathological obsessiveness with
commercial objectives at the expense of moral concerns
(Hall et al. 2007). Indeed, as Trevin˜o and Brown (2004,
p. 74) suggest, this type of behavior led to the downfall of
professional services firm Arthur Andersen: ‘‘[the]
leadership’s earlier commitment to ethics came to be
drowned out by the firm’s increasing laser-like focus on
revenues.’’ However, when a firm’s core business is under
threat, it may be left with little choice but to employ a
defensive response—irrespective of ethical ramifications.
For instance, as illustrated by Iivonen’s (2017) study of
Coca-Cola’s engagement with the issue of obesity, the
beverage company engaged in projection as a defense
mechanism in order to justify its business model.
On the whole, the studies discussed tend to focus on
productive aspects of embracing sustainability tensions
(the first and second conceptualizations) over unproductive
defensive responses, as the third conceptualization high-
lights. How these defensive responses facilitate avoidance
of sustainability tensions must be further explored, partic-
ularly given that sustainability issues such as climate
change pose high levels of complexity, threatening to
overburden firms (Levy and Lichtenstein 2011). Many
firms find it difficult, if not impossible, to embrace sus-
tainability tensions because their core product inevitability
results in trade-offs between economic and environmental
concerns (Hahn et al. 2010). This is clearly the case with
the fossil fuel industry, whereby surrendering to a zero-sum
game between fossil fuels and climate change would be
deemed by some stakeholders as ‘‘throwing in the towel.’’
Therefore, shunning or manipulating sustainability tensions
is arguably likely; it is well evidenced that firms sometimes
expend substantial resources to influencing stakeholder
perceptions through impression management strategies to
appear engaged with sustainability issues (Hooghiemstra
2000; van Halderen et al. 2016). However, an impression
management lens does not suffice to explore paradox
avoidance given that it mostly concerns the deliberate
manipulation of stakeholder perceptions, which contrasts
with the type of reactive defensive responses provoked by
sustainability tensions (Hahn et al. 2014). These responses
may not only prompt serious legitimacy issues (Wright and
Nyberg 2015b), but could also incite unethical behavior as,
by avoiding sustainability tensions, employees often fail to
act on sound moral judgment, or worse, as top management
teams develop ‘‘ethical blindness’’ (De Klerk 2017;
Palazzo et al. 2012; Trevin˜o and Brown 2004). Therefore, a
lens that specifically addresses the types of defensive
responses that are triggered to avoid complexity, including
the effects of employing such responses, is necessary. To
conceptualize this process, we draw from the concept of
organizational mythmaking, which incorporates aspects of
all the three responses discussed above.
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Organizational Mythmaking
The use of myth in organization studies has a long-standing
pedigree (Boje et al. 1982; Brown 1994; Filby and Will-
mott 1988; Ganzin et al. 2014), playing a particularly
significant role in understanding climate change (Farmer
and Cook 2013, p. 445; Hulme 2009, p. 340). While the
concept of mythmaking has been employed in several
ways, we draw largely from Barthes’ (1972) seminal
Mythologies in which he conceptualizes myths as fulfilling
a dual function, both acting as a mechanism that produces
shared meaning and as a means to legitimate existing
power structures (see also Filby and Willmott 1988).
Applied to the context of organizations, myths manifest in
the symbols—e.g., logos, rituals, slogans, brands, stories—
that, as Putnam (1983, p. 40) argues, are ‘‘not simply
reflections of organizational meanings; they are ongoing
processes that constitute organizational life.’’ Mythmaking
thus constructs meaning structures necessary to foster
shared understandings within and between organizations
and their external stakeholders (Boje et al. 1982).
Mythmaking is most salient in times of complexity
when organizations face problems without easily identifi-
able solutions (Boje 1991). As Barthes explains (1972,
p. 143), ‘‘[myth] abolishes the complexity of human acts, it
gives them a simplicity of essences, it does away with all
dialectics, […] it organizes a world without contradictions
because it is without depth.’’ When reasoning fails to
establish a sense of order, myth becomes a symbolic device
that misrepresents situations as somehow unambiguous,
thereby ‘‘constructing a rationalizing fac¸ade’’ (Brown
1994, p. 871). Generally, the less that is known about a
social context and the higher the perceived threat, the more
extreme the myth given the need to rationalize higher
levels of complexity (Bottici and Challand 2006). Sus-
tainability poses high levels of complexity given that it
often confronts organizations with sets of multiple con-
flicting, contradictory tensions that must be dealt with
simultaneously (Devinney 2009; Hahn et al. 2014).
Myths may in some instances be reactive, used to create
simplified mental maps that assuage anxiety stemming
from confronting the unknown. Organizations sometimes
engage in this type of mythmaking about climate change
and sustainability. This is evidenced by technologies such
as carbon capture and storage or geoengineering being
touted as a climate change panaceas, despite (currently)
being economically unviable, technologically impractical
and, as with geoengineering, morally dubious. Nyberg and
Wright (2014, p. 205) in particular have drawn from this
perspective to illustrate how myths perpetuate a capitalist
imaginary of ‘‘rationality’’ and ‘‘efficiency,’’ which they
argue ‘‘absorb and adapt the critique of corporate
capitalism while enabling ever more imaginative ways of
exploiting nature.’’
Along with reducing complexity, several studies address
the legitimation function of myth. For instance, myth-
making functions to legitimate certain organizational spe-
cialisms, such as public relations (Filby and Willmott
1988) or management consulting (Clegg et al. 2004).
Brown (1994) draws from this notion of myth as legiti-
mating tool to illustrate how members of an organization
gained acceptance for a new product launch that benefitted
the interests only of an elite group within the organization.
Indeed, legitimation through the production of myth is
intrinsically linked to power as mythmaking often serves to
conceal the political interests of powerholders: ‘‘myths not
only create, sustain, and legitimate historical, current and
future action, but also shape and conceal political interest
and permit organizational actors to rationalize difficult and
complex phenomena’’ (Brown 1994, p. 863).
Indeed, myth is traditionally framed as a mechanism that
obscures, used to explore, among other social phenomena,
class struggles (Cassirer 1973). As myths represent certain
narratives as ‘‘truth,’’ they exclude the political interests of
those deemed less significant or those at odds with domi-
nant myths. This highlights a more oppressive function of
mythmaking, raising concerns regarding the moral obli-
gation of the mythmaker as myths are used in the pursuit of
legitimating a social order that favors those groups in
power (David 2001; Gehmann 2015). This function of
mythmaking concerns the way myths, when enacted, have
certain discursive effects (Brown 2005; Clegg 1989). On
the one hand, mythmaking may become self-fulfilling as
mythmakers begin to act according to their own narratives.
As Brown (2003, p. 108) suggests: ‘‘[myth] encourages
feelings of omnipotence and fantasies of control among
significant stakeholder groups.’’ On the other hand, the
myth-consumer becomes embedded within a predeter-
mined identity that aligns with the interests of the myth-
maker (Bottici and Challand 2006). This highlights how
myths tend to reproduce, in codified forms, relations of
domination (Burrell and Morgan 1979; Clegg 2013).
Overall, mythmaking and the way organizations respond
to sustainability issues correspond: sustainability issues
provokes complex situations that lack readily deployable
solutions while myths provide a ‘‘veil’’ that rationalizes
and reduces complexity. Indeed, focusing on organiza-
tional mythmaking demonstrates both the agency of firms
as somewhat ‘‘aware’’ of the often irreconcilable tension
between sustainability dimensions and core business
objectives, and that the relationship between dimensions
may be obfuscated. Therefore, mythmaking offers a fruitful
lens through which to conceptualize defensive responses to
sustainability tensions, and may also shed light on a
‘‘darker side’’ of avoiding sustainability tensions, including
G. Ferns et al.
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ethical implications which remain currently underexplored
in the literature on sustainability and paradox. We therefore
pose the following questions: how does mythmaking
facilitate defense mechanisms that avoid sustainability
tensions? How does mythmaking determine corporate
responses to sustainability issues such as climate change?
Context
This study is set in an ‘‘extreme context’’ (Eisenhardt and
Graebner 2007): the controversial relationship between
multinational oil and gas companies and climate change
(Du and Vieira 2012). The oil and gas industry is uniquely
controversial, compared to other contested industries—
such as the fur, tobacco, or gambling industries—given our
dependence on fossil fuels (Bhattacharyya 2009). Oil and
gas companies are critical actors in the global debate on
climate change and have played an important role in
shaping much of the business–climate change discourse
(Levy 2005). These firms hold a vast resource base, par-
ticularly in terms of technology and financial power that,
depending on their allocation, could greatly benefit the
fight against climate change (Levy and Kolk 2002; Stevens
2016). Furthermore, besides their own production pro-
cesses—i.e., the energy needed to extract, refine, and
transport oil and gas—these firms’ core product is fossil
fuels, which makes up a substantial proportion of total
greenhouse gas emissions (IEA 2016a). As such, taking
into account environmental disasters such as spills, oil and
gas companies are often scrutinized by a wide variety of
publics and given the ‘‘classical role as the villains of cli-
mate change’’ (Lovell 2010, p. xii). This has conversely led
to increasing efforts, especially by environmental groups
and ethical investors, to stigmatize the fossil fuel industry
(Durand and Vergne 2015; Ferns and Gunther 2017). As
Ansar et al. (2013, p. 65) argue: ‘‘the outcome of this
stigmatization process […] poses a far-reaching threat to
fossil fuel companies and the vast energy value chain. Any
direct impacts pale in comparison.’’
Given pressure from publics and other stakeholders such
as civil society organizations and investors (MSCI 2014;
Paun et al. 2015), alongside increased regulatory changes
(Peeters and Uylenburg 2014, p. 181), oil and gas com-
panies have responded to climate change through a process
that has varied over time and differs among individual
companies (van Halderen et al. 2016). We chose to analyze
BP, Shell, and Total, or the companies referred to as
European supermajors (see footnote 1), given that they
have publically engaged with climate change for a longer
period of time than US supermajors, largely quiet climate
change until very recently (Goldenberg 2015; Pulver
2007).
Data and Analytic Strategy
Our dataset comprises the European supermajors’ CEO-
speak (Amernic and Craig 2006, 2007), which refers to a
CEO’s public speeches, letters to stakeholders in sustain-
ability reports, and media interviews/contributions (see
‘‘Appendix’’). As illustrated in Table 1, while a variety of
audiences are addressed through CEO-speak, most of our
corpus concerns CEO speeches at oil and gas industry
conferences and CEO letters in sustainability reports.
Hence, our data set both ‘‘looks in’’ as CEOs speak to their
own industry about climate change, and ‘‘looks out’’ by
addressing wider stakeholder groups.
This type of data is commonly utilized to analyze cor-
porate disclosures about sustainability related issues
(Beelitz and Merkl-Davies 2011; Ma¨kela¨ and Laine 2011;
Tengblad and Ohlsson 2009; van Halderen et al. 2016).
CEOs are often seen as ‘‘the social face of the organiza-
tion’’ and, particularly in the case of fossil fuel companies,
engage publically in justifying their firms’ actions in light
of climate change (Brennan and Conroy 2013, p. 176).
A CEO’s words are important and carry a certain clout;
CEO-speak can be considered as texts ‘‘which leave
meaningful traces’’ (Phillips et al. 2004, p. 640). As argued
by Ma¨kela¨ and Laine (2011, p. 219), CEO-speak not only
‘‘reflect[s] organizational culture and values but also [has]
broader cultural and political significance [as CEOs] par-
ticipate in the processes through which societies come to
frame and understand phenomena, such as environmental
challenges, sustainable development and corporate
responsibility.’’
Indeed, the words of top management are considered
emblematic of the entire organization as opposed to rep-
resenting the CEO’s personal beliefs (David 2001). While
CEO-speak may to a certain degree be ‘‘doctored’’ by
public relations professionals (see Amernic and Craig
2013, p. 381), this is less important than the fact that
stakeholders perceive the CEO’s words as reflective of the
organization’s stance on social and environmental issues
(Craig and Amernic 2004). Hence, although CEO-speak
may not represent the views of all members of an organi-
zation per se, especially if that organization is large, CEO-
speak remains a useful representation of an organizational
culture (Palmer et al. 2004). Similar to how CEO-speak
‘‘talks into being’’ an organization’s culture (Brown 1994),
so does CEO-speak construct the myths that constitute an
organizational culture. Indeed, as Boje et al. (1982, p. 18)
suggest: ‘‘myths […] represent one way in which other
elements of organizational culture are conceptually orga-
nized into a system of organizationally relevant logic.’’
Our dataset concerns texts from 1997 to 2015. We
selected 1997 as a starting point given that this was the first
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time an oil and gas supermajor—BP in this case—publi-
cally acknowledged the need to address climate change
(Lovell 2010). We concluded our dataset at the end of 2015
given that the Paris Agreement was signed—a monumental
moment that signaled a potential shift in the fossil fuel–
climate change debate (Vidal and Vaughan 2015). After
2015, fossil fuel companies have been much less explicit
about climate change strategy, which largely revolves
around waiting for governments to implement the Paris
Agreement (Kinley 2016). Texts were primarily selected
by downloading sustainability reports and CEO speeches
from the respective corporate websites and using Factiva
and Google newspaper searches for media interviews and
newspaper contributions. Online searches also directed us
to speeches that were not listed on each company’s cor-
porate Web site, but were available on third-party sites or
represented as extracts in media articles. Documents that
were not available on corporate websites but publically
available at some point in time such as previous sustain-
ability reports were requested by sending email requests to
the communications departments of each company. In
total, we collected 228 texts (see ‘‘Appendix’’).
We adopt a critical-interpretivist approach to the study
of mythmaking (Bowles 1989; Boyce 1996; Mumby 1987).
Our understanding of myth is largely inspired by inter-
pretivist work on organizational symbolism (Brown 1994;
Dandridge et al. 1980; Pondy et al. 1983), which aligns
with the constructivist underpinnings of most paradox
research (Jarzabkowski and Leˆ 2015; Smith and Lewis
2011). Furthermore, we consider mythmaking and the
defensive responses constituted therein as having certain
discursive effects (Fairclough and Wodak 1997). This is
particularly useful for our study given that a critical-in-
terpretivist approach emphasizes the formative role of
myth in shaping the very context it seeks to represent (Boje
et al. 2004; Fairhurst and Putnam 2004). In other words, the
way that supermajors talk about climate change creates a
(mis)representation of reality that, when performed,
determines their response to climate change.
Our data analysis process followed three phases. The
first involved a thematic analysis adapted from previous
work on narrative and myth in organizational studies
(Ganzin et al. 2014; Hardy and Maguire 2010; Humphreys
and Brown 2007). Accordingly, we used qualitative data
analysis software (NVivo) and engaged in an open coding
strategy to identify particular narrative structures—e.g.,
plot, the protagonist or hero, journey, end goal or desti-
nation, enabling/disabling forces, events, and coherent
identities (Boje 2001)—that the supermajors used to
address their relationship with climate change (Strauss and
Corbin 2007). This process resulted in an array of first-
order codes reorganized based on overlaps with other
similar codes (e.g., efficiency, innovation, technology) and
then grouped them into second-order themes (i.e., the
techno-fix, Promethean oil man and climate partnerships).
At this point we noticed that each myth contained dis-
tinctive contradictions seemingly re-casted by the super-
majors as somehow strategically beneficial. This led us to
Table 1 Audience coverage per data source
Audience Speech Count Text Count
Oil and gas
industry
Industry conferences and events (e.g., Oil and
Money Conference; Voser 2010b)
61 Specialist industry press (e.g., Hayward in The Oil Daily
2009)
2
Policy and
government
Think tanks and research centers (e.g., Brookings
Institute; Browne 2005a)
Government event (e.g., The Communist Party of
China; Voser 2012c)
25
Business Business events and leadership fora (e.g.,
Hayward at Business Leaders’ Summit; in
Fildes 2007)
24 Business press (e.g., Interview with Wall Street Journal;
Hayward in Chazan 2009)
Contributions in business press (e.g., article written for
FT; Browne 2002c)
24
University Business school (e.g., London Business School;
Hayward 2010a)
University center or initiative (e.g., Oxford
Energy Seminar, Oxford University; Dudley
2013c)
15
General
stakeholder
CEO letter in sustainability report (e.g., van der Veer
2008a)
51
Public Media contributions and interviews in general press (e.g.,
Interview with Telegraph; de Margerie in Mason 2010)
26
Total 125 103
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the second phase of analysis in which we focused specifi-
cally on utterances that responded to contradictory ele-
ments. During this stage, we began to oscillate between the
literature on paradox defenses and the data. Through an
abductive approach, we abstracted from the data to identify
and categorize the most salient defensive responses within
each myth. Finally, during the third phase of analysis, we
were concerned with the extent to which the supermajors’
limited engagement regarding climate change was deter-
mined by the effects of mythmaking. Here, we were
interested in how, by enacting organizational myths about
climate change, the supermajors reproduce their dominant
power position within the global climate governance
regime (Levy and Newell 2005). We thus identified dis-
courses furthered through the supermajors’ mythmaking
that propagate status quo practices of extracting, produc-
ing, and marketing fossil fuels.
Findings
In this section, we demonstrate how three myths con-
structed by the supermajors—techno-fix, Promethean oil
man, and climate partnerships—facilitate the avoidance of
sustainability tensions through certain defense mechanisms
(see Table 2). First, we discuss each myth individually,
highlighting the form of each myth and how its associated
defense mechanism acts to disregard, divert, or displace
sustainability tensions. Second, we demonstrate two dis-
cursive effects of mythmaking—marginalization of alter-
native discourses and evading responsibility for addressing
climate change—to illustrate how the supermajors’
responses to climate change are shaped.
The Techno-Fix Myth
The supermajors place significant emphasis on the virtues
of science, human ingenuity and technology as the means
to address climate change and ‘‘reach for the prize of clean,
green fossil fuels’’ (van der Veer 2005a). Through the
techno-fix myth—the most dominant myth in our dataset as
illustrated in Fig. 12—an anthropogenic notion of
‘‘managing’’ the natural environment is propagated, with
CEO-speak often referring to the merits of engineering
expertise: ‘‘[…] technology can do that for us, and we need
to be in a position of demonstrating that there are answers
to this trade-off which make it possible for people to have a
good lifestyle without damaging the environment’’
(Browne in Minnesota Public Radio 2002). Certain
2 Figure 1 provides a basic descriptive illustration of each myth’s
coverage based on different types of organizational audiences. We
calculated coverage by using NVivo’s word frequency analysis
feature. This involves searching for a collection of terms within a
selection of texts—‘coverage’ (expressed as %) refers to the amount
of times a term is identified relative to the total words within the
text(s) analyzed. Five terms were used for each myth; these stemmed
from the keywords identified during our coding process (Techno-fix
myth = technology, efficiency, innovation, science, engineering;
Promethean oil man myth = economic growth, human progress,
poverty, prosperity, living standards; Partnership myth = partnership,
NGO, United Nations, government, environmental group). In cases
where words within a given text were not those of a CEO (e.g., in
newspaper articles during an interview), these were omitted to ensure
only CEO-speak was counted.
Table 2 Overview of main findings
Myth Defense Function Illustrative quotes
Techno-fix Regression Disregard
tensions
‘‘I believe behavior and technology can do that for us, and we need to be in a position of
demonstrating that there are answers to this tradeoff which make it possible for people to have a
good lifestyle without damaging the environment.’’ (Browne in Minnesota Public Radio 2002)
‘‘In 100 years, there should be more renewables. Is it good? If we can make progress. One of the
concerns is a cost. Today we all know the most economical fuel is oil’’ (de Margerie in Mason
2010)
Promethean
oil man
Fantasy Divert
tensions
‘‘We are responding to the challenge of sustainable development and to the expectations and needs
of people. Sustainable solutions support sustainable businesses, and I’m convinced that’s good for
the economic, environmental and social progress of our planet-and for us’’ (van der Veer 1999)
‘‘Behind these big numbers you find a story of human progress. Reliable and affordable sources of
energy can help to improve many things, from living standards to life expectancy’’ (Dudley
2012a)
Climate
partnership
Projecting Displace
tensions
‘‘Governments specify their energy mix through royalties, taxation levels and permitting
requirements. […] Once the government decides, our responsibility is to be one of the lowest CO2
operators for this source of energy’’ (van der Veer 2006b)
‘‘By working in partnership with resource-rich countries we aim to create wealth for them too by
providing the energy for the basic things of life, such as heat, light and mobility. I believe that is a
noble cause.’’ (Hayward 2007a)
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technologies such as carbon capture and storage (CCS) or
liquefied natural gas (LNG) are framed as all-encompass-
ing climate change solutions. In this regard, as evidenced in
Total’s 2014 CEO letter, the European supermajors often
suggest that LNG ‘‘is set to become the world’s transitional
fossil fuel’’ (Pouyanne´ 2014a). Such a grand and general-
ized statement that oversimplifies an otherwise complex
reality acts to provide the ‘‘silver bullet’’ for the super-
majors to ‘‘deal’’ with climate change. This cause-and-ef-
fect rationality is a cornerstone of the techno-fix myth as
Voser’s (2012a) speech title exemplifies: ‘‘The natural gas
revolution: a secure, abundant force for good.’’
The techno-fix myth represents nature as something to
be valued in economic terms—i.e., putting nature on a
balance sheet and accounting for the negative impacts of
the oil and gas extraction, refinement and transportation
process. As such, much of the CEO-speak regarding this
myth is managerial, expressed through rational rhetorical
appeals (logos). As Total’s CEO, de Margerie, asserts in an
interview with the Telegraph: ‘‘In 100 years, there should
be more renewables. Is it good? If we can make progress.
One of the concerns is a cost. Today we all know the most
economical fuel is oil’’ (Mason 2010). Accordingly, cli-
mate change is not portrayed as a uniquely distinct con-
sideration that impedes the overall strategy of the
organization. Instead, controlling for the effects of climate
change becomes a concern that can be effectively managed
within the parameters of standard business practices such
as, inter alia, cost–benefit analysis.
As highlighted in Fig. 1, the techno-fix myth is most
discernable when CEOs address students at universities. A
good example of this is Tony Hayward’s (2010a) speech to
London Business School in which the then BP CEO
explained: ‘‘[the] first conclusion is that, in all circum-
stances, energy efficiency is the No.1 priority. That means
more efficient vehicles, buildings and electronic appli-
ances—more investment in technology and infrastructure
such as smart grids.’’ There is no denial of climate change
or apologetic tone: climate change is faced head on and
techno-fix solutions are swiftly offered. BP’s environ-
mental concerns are made to fit with business-as-usual
through language of managerialism and risk, and not vice
versa. This reduces the threat posed by climate change by
dismissing the need to radically overall economic systems
or firm practices (e.g., Klein 2014).
Defense Mechanism 1: Regression
Underpinning the techno-fix myth is the unwillingness of
the supermajors to depart from long-established practices,
despite professing the need to change those practices in
order to adapt to climate change in the future. Therefore,
the techno-fix myth facilitates regression whereby histori-
cal accounts are used to legitimate present action and
future intent. For example, Shell’s Peter Voser in a speech
at the Woodrow Wilson Center in 2009 entitled ‘‘The
Energy Company of the Future’’ stated: ‘‘[we’ve] learned
from experience—sometimes the hard way—that it takes
time to develop and build a market for new types of energy.
That is why a more efficient use of energy is crucial.’’ By
reemphasizing certain past realities as ‘‘truths’’—in this
case regarding the virtues of markets and technology—
‘‘solving’’ climate change becomes reliant on habits that,
somewhat paradoxically, caused climate change in the first
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place. Moreover, historical figures are often invoked to
demonstrate that challenges these figures faced were
inevitably overcome, implying that the same will occur
with climate change. That is, CEOs frequently use ‘‘his-
torical theorizations of change’’ in a rhetorical sense ‘‘to
counteract radical change and to promote evolutionary or
path-dependent change’’ (Suddaby and Greenwood 2005,
p. 52). For example, Shell’s Moody-Stuart (2000) recol-
lects challenges of the railway age: ‘‘gas developments
have much in common with the beginning of the railway
age in Britain as engineers like Robert Stephenson and
Isambard Kingdom Brunel struggled to carry the railway
tracks over waterways.’’ Similarly, BP’s Bob Dudley
(Dudley 2013a) likens the climate change crisis to earlier
energy challenges that were overcome: ‘‘The world’s major
source of oil in the 1850s was the whale. But as many
species were hunted to near-extinction, Colonel Edwin
Drake decided to look for a new source. His success in
drilling a well in Titusville, Pennsylvania gave birth to the
modern energy industry.’’
Promethean Oil Man Myth
The supermajors consider themselves noble upholders of
modern civilization, providing ‘‘the energy for the basic
things of life, such as heat, light and mobility’’ (Hayward
2007a). This is reminiscent of the ancient Greek myth of
Prometheus, a Titan who not only helped humans stand
upright but also famously provided them with fire stolen
from the gods (Dryzek 1997). The crux of this myth is
demonstrated by Dudley’s (2013b) speech at Deendayal
Petroleum University, India, in which he asserted that
access to BP’s energy ‘‘represents millions of people
moving out of poverty, into homes and jobs, enjoying heat,
light and mobility to improve their lives. Here in India, I
know, access to energy really transforms lives.’’ The
‘‘transformational’’ role of energy, and the industry’s role
as providing the impetus to lift people out of poverty,
rationalizes the supermajors’ position. Indeed, as de
Margerie (2012) emphasized in Total’s CSR Report:
‘‘Without access to energy, there is no development.’’
A central theme in the construction of this myth is the
risks that supermajors’ undertake to access ‘‘energy’’,
confronting and ‘‘controlling’’ nature (Lovelock 2010) in
the process much like Prometheus confronting the gods.
This is often highlighted by the common narrative of
successfully drilling in ultra-deep water. In a speech at the
Arab Strategy Forum in Dubai, Shell’s van der Veer
(2006a) explained: ‘‘[…] the industry has a good record of
meeting these kind of environmental challenges. We only
have to look back thirty years ago to when the conditions in
the North Sea were seen by many as too hostile for suc-
cessful development.’’ Van der Veer anchors deep into the
past to demonstrate how Shell has successfully confronted
and resolved difficult challenges, in this case regarding a
hostile nature able to be ‘‘overcome’’.
In the construction of this myth, the supermajors often
draw on ideographs (McGee 1980), or ‘‘god terms’’ that
appeal to a common good and are generally considered
appropriate by a wide set of audiences—e.g., rights,
development, progress, growth, and prosperity. A particu-
larly important ideograph is ‘‘energy,’’ a frequently used
synecdoche, or a figure of speech, representing ‘‘oil and
gas.’’ In this vein, BP’s Browne (2004a), at a speech at the
Princeton Environmental Institute remarked:
Can we transcend what appears to be a harsh and
unacceptable tradeoff between the goal of improving
living standards – and on the other hand the equally
imperative goal of protecting the natural environment
which sustains human life? Energy is at the heart of
that tradeoff.
The emptiness in the term ‘‘energy’’ in this case symbol-
ically transcends the trade-off between living standards and
environmental protection. In other words, as Browne
(2004a) notes, unavoidable trade-offs are displaced by
the principal task of securing ‘‘energy.’’ What exactly
‘‘energy’’ constitutes is somewhat irrelevant; what is
important is only that it is secured. Another commonly
used ideograph is ‘‘responsibility,’’ often employed in
reference to a higher purpose, as illustrated in Thierry
Desmarest’s (2002) CEO letter: ‘‘Corporate spirit and a
sense of responsibility are closely linked.’’ Interestingly,
the promethean oil man myth is especially prevalent in the
CEO’s letter in sustainability reports (see Fig. 1), which
may allude to the particularly emotional rhetorical appeal
(pathos) in sustainability reports as compared to traditional
annual reports (e.g., Castello´ and Lozano 2011).
Defense Mechanism 2: Fantasy
A fantasy of omnipotence, immortality and prestige is the
defense mechanism driving the Promethean oil man myth.
Through this fantasy, the supermajors imagine themselves
as the answer to climate change, arguing that despite being
its cause, they are concurrently the most likely solution,
possessing ‘‘financial muscle and technical expertise to
help take their ideas from the lab to demonstration level
and then to commercial scale’’ (Voser 2010a). The
grandiosity of such claims helps escape the harsh reality
that fossil fuels and climate change are indeed irreconcil-
able, which is evidenced by the frequent recalling of
exaggerated heroic acts, as Tony Hayward reminiscences:
‘‘The oil and gas we’re developing in deepwater Gulf of
Mexico requires the same kind of technology it takes to put
someone on the moon’’ (in Chazan 2009). This reflects a
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fantasy of omnipotence, linking BP with superhuman,
nostalgic feats such as the moon landing, thereby obscuring
the reality that their core product and mitigating climate
change are, in fact, irreconcilable. Through such ‘‘moral
tales’’ (Leeuwen and Jacob 2007, p. 105), the supermajors
further entrench their self-proclaimed role as noble
upholder of modern civilization. For instance, in a speech
at the European Conference of Environmental and Engi-
neering Geophysics Tony Hayward (2007a) argued: ‘‘[…]
when it comes to dealing in a timely and practical manner
with the great insecurities of the early 21st century, the
energy industry is not just part of the solution, it is the
solution.’’
A fantasy defense mechanism constructs an ‘‘other’’
framed as the reason for the supermajors’ continued car-
bon-intensive practices: those without ‘‘fire’’ in developing
countries, so to speak. As de Margerie (2007, p. 2)
described:
Global energy demand is going to remain strong,
because developing countries lag far behind indus-
trialized nations. How can you justify dashing the
hopes of the billion and a half people in the world
who don’t have electricity, or crushing the aspirations
of people who want to own a car in China or India,
where there’s only one car per 50 or 100 inhabitants,
compared with one for every two people in the West?
This implicitly pits ‘‘dashing the hopes of the billion and a
half people’’ against preserving the natural environment,
making it seem somehow unethical to discredit the
industry. The Promethean oil man myth thus operates on
the fantasy of supermajors as poverty eradicators, deflect-
ing attention from the issue at hand: climate change.
Climate Partnerships Myth
When confronted with climate change, the European
supermajors frequently posit that such environmental
issues can only be successfully addressed by partnering
with actors not traditionally associated with the oil and gas
industry—e.g., civil society organizations and govern-
ments. As these actors possess a pre-established credibility,
projecting has the additional rhetorical appeal of validating
the character (ethos) of the European supermajors through
association with authority (see Vaara et al. 2006, p. 799).
For example, as Total’s Desmarest argued: ‘‘[…] we are
working with the other stakeholders and in partnership with
governments, which are the only organizations with the
authority to set the policy orientations that frame our ini-
tiatives.’’ Not only do supermajors acknowledge a need to
partner and engage in dialog, they also embrace a need to
be held accountable by external stakeholders, or as Voser
asserted: ‘‘We at Shell […] must not be shy to open up to
scrutiny’’ (Voser 2011a). Of course, this is based on vol-
untary reciprocity: There are no hard laws committing
either party to action.
The industry’s relationship with the state is approached
through partnerships, as Voser (2012b) during a speech to
policy makers at the World Water Forum, explains:
We need partnerships that marry the commercial
expertise of the private sector. We need partnerships
that remain impartial, and that don’t fall under the
influence of one interest group. And we need part-
nerships that make a tangible impact on the policy-
making process
Governments are therefore imagined as necessary to the
commercial viability of investing in a low-carbon future,
which usually takes the forms of either providing subsidies
for energy efficient technology investments, or developing
carbon trading platforms such as the EU emissions trading
system (EU-ETS). In a speech to the Singapore Energy
Summit, Voser (2011b) asserted: ‘‘Government has an
important role in setting the rules, in spurring investment in
new technologies that may not see a payoff for many years.
Rather than choose winners and losers, government should
set the end goals, then provide appropriate incentives that
let the market determine the most effective solutions.’’ This
shifts the onus of responsibility from the supermajors to
governments; after all, as Shell’s van der Veer commented
in a Guardian interview, ‘‘Governments need business to
help […] but it is not Shell who can solve the CO2 problem
in the world’’ (in Macalister 2007).
Defense Mechanism 3: Projecting
By underscoring the role of external organizations as
necessary to addressing climate change, the climate part-
nerships myth employs a projective defense mechanism.
Here, responsibility to address climate change is relocated
from the source of the problem—i.e., fossil fuels extracted
from the ground—to external sources. Thereby, tensions
stemming from a zero-sum game between fossil fuels and
climate change are placed onto the transnational climate
policy community, NGOs, national governments, and
consumers. Interestingly, despite shifting responsibility to
external sources, the supermajors do not completely dis-
credit the ideal of free markets. As Hayward (2007a) of BP
described: ‘‘History firmly suggests that all these problems
are susceptible to action and innovation. This process can
be aided or hindered by the way in which governments
perform their role of policy making and the enactment of
law.’’ As such, ‘‘action and innovation’’ is ‘‘aided or hin-
dered’’ to the extent that they are efficiently regulated by
governments. Based on this logic, if climate change is not
adequately addressed, it is not the fault of the supermajors’
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actions or lack thereof, but because they were not properly
regulated by an external (responsible) party.
The production of tar sands, often considered particu-
larly carbon intensive (Crooks 2015), vividly illustrates this
defense mechanism. As van der Veer (2006b) explained in
an interview: ‘‘Governments specify their energy mix
through royalties, taxation levels and permitting require-
ments. […] Once the government decides, our responsi-
bility is to be one of the lowest CO2 operators for this
source of energy.’’ Because responsibility is not internal—
i.e., the supermajors will not self-regulate their production
of tar sands—ecological concern is relocated from tar
sands producers to ‘‘governments, NGOs, and other critical
stakeholders’’ (Voser 2011c).
Discursive Effects of Avoiding Tension Through
Mythmaking
As illustrated above, the above myths construct defensive
responses that avoid the contradiction between being a
fossil fuel company and engaging in climate change miti-
gation. There are two particularly noteworthy effects: (1)
marginalizing alternative discourses through regression and
entrenchment in the past; (2) evading responsibility for
addressing climate change by transferring tension away
from the source of the problem. We show that through
these effects, the supermajors foreclose the possibility of
substantive action to mitigate climate change.
First, by entrenching tensions deeper into past under-
standings the supermajors reinforce certain ‘‘truths’’ that,
over time, marginalize discourses that do not conform to
these ‘‘truths.’’ This exemplified most noticeably in the
techno-fix and Promethean oil man myths. For example,
regarding the techno-fix myth, the supermajors exhibit a
near obsession with measurability in which addressing
climate change can only be achieved with increased effi-
ciency, better performance, and risk–benefit evaluation.
Browne (1997) in his famous speech at Stanford remarked:
‘‘[…] we need a better understanding of how our own
emissions of carbon can be monitored and controlled, using
a variety of measures including sequestration. It is a very
simple business lesson that what gets measured gets man-
aged.’’ Any investment that could address climate change
must be proven under this rubric. As such, significant
investment in renewables, for example, becomes particu-
larly difficult because there are too many ‘‘unknowns’’ that
cannot be necessarily be calculated, proven, or measured
(Levy and Lichtenstein 2011). Even if initiatives do con-
form to this ‘‘ideology of numbers’’ (Chelli and Gendron
2012), such as pricing carbon through financial markets,
they tend to reproduce the obsession with measurability,
since carbon markets are themselves predicated on dis-
courses of measurability (Bo¨hm et al. 2012). Therefore, the
supermajors become trapped by their fixation with mea-
surability, which in turn excludes alternative discourses
that cannot be easily quantified such as deep ecology or
systems thinking (Devall 1991; Williams et al. 2017).
This narrow identification with the past reproduces an
over-reliance on organizational practices that are not suit-
able for addressing large-scale environmental issues. Fur-
thermore, using preexisting accounting tools and
calculation metrics to account for the risks of climate
change reinforces the objectification, and ultimately reifi-
cation, of nature (Ma¨kela¨ and Laine 2011). Because the
supermajors are entrenched into past habits of measura-
bility, the natural environment is consequently stripped of
its intrinsic properties and presented as an object to be
valued, as de van der Veer (2009a) nonchalantly notes in
his key note speech at the 10th International Oil Summit in
Paris: ‘‘Mother Nature put it there, and we take it out.’’
Notwithstanding measurability, as detailed in the dis-
cussion of the defense mechanism of regression in relation
to the techno-fix myth, analogies that emphasize
notable historical figures are frequently employed to
legitimate modern-day practices. While these accounts
produce a strong nostalgic association with industry’s
heroes from past, they likewise reproduce a hegemonic
masculinity that is pervasive in the oil and gas industry
(e.g., Miller 2004). Winston Churchill is frequently used by
BP in this manner:
That’s the challenge. So what are we doing? First,
we’re investing in the next generation of oil and gas
resources around the world. Winston Churchill once
said that security in oil came from a diversity of
supply. That was right in 1915—when, incidentally,
he was a shareholder in BP on behalf of the gov-
ernment, some 50 percent—and it is right right now
(Browne 2005a)
In this instance, during a speech at the Brookings
Institution, BP’s John Browne refers to the climate
‘‘challenge’’ as similar to a situation that Churchill, at the
time serving as First Lord of the British Admiralty, faced
when he proposed that the British naval fleet switch from
domestic coal to BP’s oil. This draws attention not to
innovative practices that could combat climate change, but
to past successes and similar challenges faced by patriar-
chal, historical figures.
The second discursive effect of mythmaking concerns
how the supermajors shun responsibility for addressing
climate change by transferring tension away from the
source of the problem—i.e., the extraction and production
of fossil fuels. This occurs most saliently with the Pro-
methean oil man myth and with the climate partnership
myth. In terms of the former, rather than focus on the
realities of climate change, the supermajors assert a need to
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‘‘take care’’ of people from ‘‘resource-rich countries’’ who
‘‘need food, housing and all the other basic products and
services’’ (Browne in Mahony 2004). This neocolonial
sentiment misrepresents developing countries as necessar-
ily impoverished and somehow inferior without basic ser-
vices such as electricity, lost without the help of the
supermajors. Therefore, the supermajors scapegoat those at
‘‘the bottom of the energy ladder’’ (van der Veer 2007a) for
continued demand for fossil fuels. As Voser (2011d) asks:
‘‘Hundreds of millions more will emerge from energy
poverty in the coming years, buying their first fridge,
computer or car. What will all this mean for overall energy
use?’’ From a psychoanalytic perspective, this is common
with projection defenses—blame is usually transferred
from those who dominate, toward their weaker subordi-
nates (Oliver et al. 2008).
A similar picture unfolds with the climate partnership
myth as responsibility for solving climate change is
transferred to external parties. There is, after all, little need
to pursue alternative energy sources or invest substantially
in carbon reduction technologies when responsibility to
solve climate change becomes that of the state or energy
consumers. This disregard for considering alternatives is
further enforced through the patronizing tone that perme-
ates much of the CEO-speak, particularly during the typi-
cally unscripted Q&A portion of speeches. CEOs often
insist that challengers ‘‘face the facts’’ and be ‘‘realistic.’’
As de Margerie argues: ‘‘It will be ages before carbon–
neutral energy sources overtake fossil fuels […]. Admitting
that doesn’t mean we’re somehow irresponsible; rather, it
means we’re facing the facts and using them to develop
actionable, real-world solutions’’ (de Margerie 2008a). Our
interpretation of such statements is that de Margerie con-
siders himself, and presumably his European supermajor
counterparts, as somehow more knowledgeable about cli-
mate change compared to those who challenge the industry,
framed as somehow ‘‘unrealistic.’’ Conversely, de Marg-
erie’s bravado may be considered a mask that represses his
own insecurities regarding the complexities of climate
change vis-a`-vis the fossil fuel industry.
In sum, it is evident that left with little choice, the
supermajors have engaged extensively in organizational
mythmaking. This is facilitated by defensive responses that
obfuscate much of tension stemming from complexities
associated with climate change. In terms of the discursive
effects of enacting these myths, the conclusion we draw is
that it seems increasingly unlikely that the supermajors
would fully engage in large-scale climate change
mitigation.
Discussion
The motivation for this study arose from the generally
productive tone of corporate sustainability studies that use
a paradox lens to argue that sustainability dimensions
should be embraced, even if they seem contradictory (Gao
and Bansal 2013; Hahn et al. 2014, 2015). Most of this
literature seemed to overlook that a ‘‘paradox approach’’
would be difficult to implement in industries where trade-
offs between economic and environmental concerns are
unavoidable (Wright and Nyberg 2015a). This led us to
base our study on fossil fuel companies, asking what these
companies do upon being confronted with what ex-BP
CEO Lord Browne refers to as an ‘‘existential threat’’ to the
oil and gas industry: climate change (Clark 2014). In this
respect, we demonstrate how the European supermajors
have, over time, reconstituted climate change as something
they embrace. Indeed, it is more difficult to discredit those
organizations that seem to embrace that for which they are
being discredited. Below we discuss some of our study’s
main contributions to the literature on tensions and cor-
porate sustainability, and reflect on the ethical implications
of our findings.
While most studies on corporate sustainability tensions
focus on how embracing tensions can have particularly
powerful effects if properly harnessed, we detail how
avoiding tensions may also have powerful—albeit unde-
sirable and unsustainable—effects. Although capitalizing
on paradox can ‘‘[lead] to creative solutions to complex
problems such as sustainability’’ (Van der Byl and Slaw-
inski 2015, p. 59), it can also have the reverse effect in
terms of reinforcing an ‘‘instrumental logic’’ (Gao and
Bansal 2013). This occurred in the case of the supermajors
as tensions between economic growth and environmental
protection were obfuscated through mythmaking to appear
as if sustainability is at the heart of these companies,
without necessarily being so at all. As such, we propose
that the literature on tensions within corporate sustain-
ability seriously consider instances in which the idea of
embracing contradictory sustainability dimensions is mis-
used or even abused to reproduce the status quo.
Our findings question the extent to which integrative
perspectives on sustainability can and should be pursued in
cases where trade-offs between sustainability dimensions
are inevitable (Margolis and Walsh 2003). While an inte-
grative sustainability perspective certainly appeals con-
ceptually and in certain cases also operationally, its allure
as a ‘‘transcendental’’ form of sustainability can be
(mis)appropriated by firms. Few studies in the corporate
sustainability literature have explicitly addressed such a
defensive response to tensions. To our knowledge, the only
empirical study to do so is Iivonen’s (2017) account of how
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Coca-Cola engages in a projection defense to deflect
responsibility for obesity issues. Interestingly, the author
calls for further research in this area by emphasizing that:
‘‘Attention must therefore be paid to such situations in
further developing the integrative view in the less-than-
ideal world in which powerful organizations and industries,
controversial or not, do not easily cease to exist’’ (Iivonen
2017: forthcoming). We addressed this call in many ways
by focusing on the ‘‘less-than-ideal world’’ of a fossil fuel
economy, building on Iivonen (2017) both by considering
additional defense mechanisms (i.e., regression and fan-
tasy), and by emphasizing the discursive effects of defen-
sive responses.
Our study does not neglect that there may be many other
cases that illustrate the creative, productive and synergistic
potential of a paradox approach to sustainability (Hahn
et al. 2015; Jay 2013). However, there is a potential danger
in not critically distinguishing between, for instance, the
way cross-sectoral social partnerships between firms,
governments and NGOs adopt a paradox approach to har-
ness the tension between competition and collaboration
(Stadtler 2017), and how fossil fuel companies can use
paradox instrumentally to distort tension between their core
product and climate change. While the former might
enhance ‘‘coopetition’’ (Garud et al. 2002), the latter only
reproduces practices that pose an imminent threat to the
well-being of the Earth system (IPCC 2014). This raises
valid concerns regarding, for instance, notions of the jus-
tice, equity and morality of perpetuating a fossil fuel
energy system by distorting complexities of climate
change. From a deontological perspective, do the super-
majors not have a duty to reduce the harm its products are
causing to humanity and the natural environment? After
all, as Desmond Tutu (2014) remarked, the negative impact
of human activity on the Earth system is both ‘‘the human
rights challenge of our time [and] a deep injustice.’’ That
climate change may result in significant devastation for
societies, especially those in the Global South (Hallegatte
et al. 2011), raises serious concern as to the moral integrity
and duty of the mythmaker—in this case, fossil fuel com-
panies. Hence, we suggest that more research consider how
the ‘‘dark side’’ of managing paradox may be covering up
practices that are in breach of basic ethical principles.
More generally, this study also contributes to the orga-
nization studies literature on tensions, contradictions, and
paradox (Putnam et al. 2016; Schad et al. 2016). We extend
current theory by exploring defensive responses as con-
structed through organizational mythmaking (Boje et al.
1982; Brown 1994; Filby and Willmott 1988; Ganzin et al.
2014). Indeed, paradox literature suggests that defensive
responses, such as those identified in this study, are only
effective in the short-term as tensions inevitably resurface
(Smith and Lewis 2011; Vince and Broussine 1996).
Therefore, organizational paradox scholars might reject our
emphasis on how mythmaking is used to avoid tensions
longer term. However, mythmaking is not a pure avoidance
strategy. Indeed, as Barthes (1972, p. 143) notes: ‘‘Myth
does not deny things, on the contrary, its function is to talk
about them; simply, it purifies them, it makes them inno-
cent, it gives them a natural and eternal justification.’’
While the supermajors’ responses were certainly con-
structed in a defensive manner, they were proactively
employed through mythmaking as a symbolic act of
purification, simplification, and justification over time.
Mythmaking thus involves confronting paradox by actively
obfuscating tensions in such a way that their anxiety-pro-
voking tendencies are rendered impotent.
As per the famous war adage ‘‘the best defense is a good
offence,’’ our findings suggest that the best way to avoid
tensions may be, in some cases, to actively distort them.
This does not conform to the traditional divide between
defensive and proactive responses as advocated by most
paradox research (Lewis 2000). Instead, depending on the
situation in which the response unfolds, coupled with the
intent of the actor constructing the response, defensive and
proactive strategies potentially complement one another.
Jarzabkowski and Leˆ (2015, p. 37) for instance hint toward
this possibility by exploring the role of humor as a way to
construct responses to paradox, illustrating how ‘‘at the
micro-level, all responses are in their own way ‘active’
responses.’’ Similarly, in our study, defensive responses
were also actively constructed; however, our case differs
given that defensive responses continued to repress rather
than expose tensions, with dangerous consequences for the
planet. By avoiding sustainability tensions, the supermajors
are increasingly entrenched in a single option reality where
‘‘the future becomes beholden to the past’’ (Smith and
Lewis 2011, p. 291). The fossil fuel industry’s refusal to
substantively engage with sustainability tensions is con-
sidered by some to be detrimental to the industry itself
(Mckibben 2012), as evidenced by a recent Chatham House
report—International Oil: Companies The Death of the
Old Business Model (Stevens 2016).
Ultimately, we show that paradox can be actively con-
structed in such a way that it becomes as strategic resource
(e.g., Hardy et al. 2000). In this context, there are serious
ethical implications as tensions between business and the
natural environment—and nature itself—are used as means
to an end, the ‘‘end’’ in this case being shareholder value.
In addition, that nature possesses any sort of intrinsic worth
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is rejected. Irrespective of these ethical concerns, that
paradoxes are purposefully molded and taken advantage of
is not frequently discussed in the literature. This process, or
what Czarniawska (1997) calls ‘‘deparadoxification,’’ pla-
ces a somewhat different light on paradox since the friction
that a paradox perspective cites as the trigger for organi-
zational change becomes suppressed and skewed to align
with the interest of its manipulator (Reay and Hinings
2009; Townley 2002). In many respects, particularly from
a political economy perspective, climate change is inher-
ently contentious and should arguably remain so (Wit-
tneben et al. 2012). Therefore, corporate discourses on
climate change that are stripped of contentiousness are
arguably less likely to provoke any sort of large-scale
change. We highlighted how mythmaking was used to
mask contradictions and to propagate the status quo,
therefore fostering inaction on climate change. As Benson
argues (1977, p. 8), without contradiction there is no
‘‘continuing source of tensions, conflicts, and the like
which may, under some circumstances, shape […] action to
change the present order.’’
Our final contribution underscores the use of myth as a
means to examine corporate discourses on environmental
issues (e.g., Wright and Nyberg 2014). The explicit use of
myth in studies of organization and management theory has
lost its prominence, arguably given that myth is already
incorporated into contemporary theory as its ‘‘cultural
component,’’ for example, among others, considering the
way that organizations resemble ‘‘rationalized myths’’ a` la
Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) seminal piece on institutional
theory. However, myths are representative of deeply
ingrained sociopolitical ideas and practices that, through
their dramaturgy, evoke an emotional response difficult to
capture an overt focus on myth as an analytically distinc-
tive construct. By using a myth lens we avoid considering
communication, on the one hand, a mere rhetorical tool
(van Halderen et al. 2016), and on the other, as purely
constitutive (Christensen et al. 2013). Myth instead con-
siders strategic and constitutive forms of communication as
mutually informative. That is, not only did the supermajors
produce myths about climate change, but they were also
constituted by the myths they themselves created (Brown
2006). As illustrated, this dual function of myth has certain
discursive effects that not only marginalizes alternative
discourses, but also constrains their ability to adapt to
climate change.
In all, mythmaking is particularly useful to exploring
issues such as climate change as probable solutions (e.g.,
‘‘de-growth’’ or ecological preservation) often run counter
to dominant myths that have existed since the
enlightenment period; e.g., human ingenuity and our
superior dominance over all that is non-human (Dryzek
1997). Mythmaking provides organizations with a means to
construct a narrative that might seem to overcome tensions
between economy and ecology, while actually being
‘‘empty’’: ‘‘[myth] is, literally, a ceaseless flowing out, a
hemorrhage, or perhaps an evaporation, in short a percep-
tible absence’’ (Barthes 1972, p. 142). The ‘‘emptiness’’ of
the myths produced by the European supermajors is evi-
denced by overwhelming reliance on consequentialist
claims that the use of fossil fuels is morally justified
because of some benefit to the greater good (especially the
Promethean oil man myth). However, what is considered
‘‘good’’ for society, what is considered harmful, and what
group in society should benefit, is exclusively defined by
BP, Shell and Total’s own teleological views. It almost
solely benefits the utility of the supermajors, not those of
marginalized groups in society because, after all, less-ad-
vantaged members of society will likely be most burdened
by climate change (Hallegatte et al. 2011). Thus, it should
be earnestly questioned whether the utilitarian justification
used by the European supermajors—i.e., that fossil fuels
produces more good for society than harm—remains valid
especially as alternative energy becomes increasingly
viable (Carrington 2017; IEA 2016b).
Limitations, Future Research, and Conclusion
Our study has certain limitations. First, our focus on BP,
Shell, and Total omits other companies that due to differ-
ences in size, status, and location, might construct other
types of myths about climate change. However, we selec-
ted these companies given their notorious status as the
villains of climate change, as evidenced for example by the
stigmatization efforts of several publics (Ansar et al. 2013;
Ferns and Gunther 2017). There are other fossil fuel
companies that depending, for example, on their location,
would construct their defensive responses differently
within their corporate disclosures. For instance, a study that
compares US supermajors—Exxon and Chevron—to
European supermajors may yield interesting insights (van
Halderen et al. 2016).
Furthermore, our focus on CEO-speak excluded many
voices both internal and external to the organization. Due
to the unwillingness of many oil industry representatives to
speak about climate change as is common in controversial
industries (Lindgreen et al. 2012), CEO-speak was a nec-
essary focus. Ideally, however, for future studies, it would
be useful to gain access to employees that work ‘‘on the
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front lines,’’ in order to explore how micro defensive
responses are constructed to address situational complexi-
ties related to environmental concerns (e.g., Sharma and
Jaiswal 2017). As such, while CEO-speak lays a foundation
for understanding defensive responses on an organizational
level, future work should consider the construction of
paradox on operational levels.
Lastly, by basing our case on fossil fuel companies we
emphasized an extreme case despite there being other cases
in which trade-offs may not inevitability occur. As such,
our case might not be generalizable to other sectors. For
example, low resource intensive sectors such as the finan-
cial services or certain high-tech sectors might not expe-
rience the near impossibility to adapt to climate change,
depending on the extent to which their stakeholders
demand they do (Williams 2014). However, industries that
are not necessarily fossil fuel based but implicated as such,
e.g., air transport and livestock production, might similarly
at some point also engage in the construction of defensive
responses, thus presenting an opportunity for future
research.
Nevertheless, it is evident from our study that the
European supermajors reproduce their own inability and
unwillingness to substantively address climate change. On
the one hand, this is especially worrying because of the
catastrophic implications of climate change if unaddressed.
On the other hand, it seems inevitable that in continuing
constructing and enacting myths about their relationship
with climate change, BP, Shell, and Total are, in effect,
drilling their own graves. The deeper they drill, the more
difficult it is to envision alternatives and capitalize on those
opportunities
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